

Cognitive complexity, expertise and prediction accuracy in venture selection

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 - early-stage resources are scarce; screening decides which ideas scale
 - incubators, VCs and agencies act as **gatekeepers** of innovation

Motivation

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- Assessing venture quality is **hard**
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 - deep uncertainty about future value
- A **Bayesian benchmark** defines good decisions
 - the best one can do given noisy evidence

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- 2 **Accuracy** When do expertise and complexity affect the accuracy of selecting high-quality ventures?
- 3 **Uncertainty.** How much does the evidence reduce uncertainty about venture quality and how does that depend on expertise and complexity?

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- We build and test a **Bayesian benchmark** for an early-stage incubator's selection problem.
- **Judges think Bayesian:** the benchmark matches $\sim 79\%$ of recommendations, $\sim 85\%$ when missing a good venture hurts more than admitting a bad one.
- **But signal information content is limited:** judges and the optimum reach only $\sim 60\%$ accuracy in discriminating ventures.
 - Accuracy \downarrow with complexity and \uparrow with expertise across judges, not within a judge over time.
 - Uncertainty is lower for experts, higher for complex ventures.
 - The **expertise premium** peaks at **intermediate complexity**.

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3. **Bayesian decision models:** Grether (1980), Baley and Veldkamp (2023), Agrawal et al. (2025)

1. Context
2. Conceptual framework
3. Empirical strategy
4. Results
 - Normative benchmark
 - Accuracy and uncertainty
5. Conclusion

Context

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 - Since 2007, +900 ventures incubated, raised \sim 1€ Bln

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 - A pool of judges randomly assigned evaluate each application on 14 business criteria and provide an admission recommendation

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Data

- All eligible applications from 9 batches (fall 2021 - winter 2024)
- 1638 evaluations and 579 applications
- Economic performance (FTEs, total funding, survival status) of all applicants as of Summer 2024

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A judge acts as a **Bayesian classifier** under noisy evidence

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- **Decision** Recommend \iff the posterior clears a threshold.

▶ Theoretical model

Stylized representation




Figure 1: Conceptual model

Stylized representation of the model of inference and decision.

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2. **Cognitive complexity**: the degree to which the decision environment is complex to assess.
3. **Accuracy**: the percentage correct recommendations under an optimal decision rule.
4. **Cognitive uncertainty**: how much uncertainty about a venture's quality remains after observing the signal

Testable hypotheses

- **Hypothesis 1a:**
Experience improves evaluation accuracy.
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- **Hypothesis 1a:**
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- **Hypothesis 1a:**
Experience improves evaluation accuracy.
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- **Hypothesis 2a:**
Venture complexity reduces evaluation accuracy.
- **Hypothesis 2b:**
Venture complexity increases cognitive uncertainty.
- **Hypothesis 3:**
The accuracy gap between experienced and non-experienced judges grows with complexity up to an intermediate level, then declines.

▶ Accuracy

▶ Uncertainty

Empirical strategy

Measurements I

Variable	Measurement
Continuous venture quality	Venture i average rank of FTE and cumulative funding, each residualized on batch fixed effects; set to 0 for ventures no longer operational in 2024
Binary venture quality	$\hat{v}_i = 1$ if continuous quality of venture i lies in the top 40%, 0 otherwise; the 40% threshold reflects the incubator's final-stage admission capacity

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Signal	$\hat{S}_{ij} \in \{14, \dots, 42\}$, sum of the 14 criterion scores assigned by a judge j to venture i
Decision rule	$\hat{a}_{ij}(\hat{S}_{ij}) \in \{0, 1\}$, binary recommendation of judge j to admit venture i (1 = recommend, 0 = do not recommend)


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Decision rule	$\hat{a}_{ij}(\hat{S}_{ij}) \in \{0, 1\}$, binary recommendation of judge j to admit venture i (1 = recommend, 0 = do not recommend)
Expertise	$\hat{e}_{i,j}$:= number of evaluations judge j has completed prior to evaluating venture i .
Complexity	$\hat{\sigma}_i \in \mathbb{R}_+$, two measures of evaluation difficulty: <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. <i>Disagreement</i>: normalized within-venture variance of residuals from \hat{S}_{ij} on judge FE2. <i>Text</i>: RIX readability index of the application text

Measurements II

Variable	Measurement
Accuracy	Proportion of judges' recommendations to admit top quality ventures and to reject low quality ventures over the total number of recommendations
Cognitive Uncertainty	Average variance of the distribution of venture quality conditional on signal $\mathbb{E}_{\hat{s}} [\text{Var}(\hat{v} \hat{s})]$

How well do judges individually classify ventures?

- **Recommendations do track quality.** Recommended ventures survive more (+23%) and employ more (+57% FTEs) than rejected ones
 - but weakly linked to funding 

Judges' classification accuracy

How well do judges individually classify ventures?

- **Recommendations do track quality.** Recommended ventures survive more (+23%) and employ more (+57% FTEs) than rejected ones
 - but weakly linked to funding [▶ Outcomes](#)
- **Yet accuracy is only 63%:**
 - better at **rejecting** weak ventures than **spotting** strong ones [▶ Confusion matrix](#)
 - most errors cluster at **intermediate scores** [▶ Score & errors](#)

Two blocks: estimate normative benchmark, then test the mechanisms

- 1 **Empirical Bayes classifier.** Identify top-quality ventures from the score
 - How accurate is the **best feasible rule** given the score, and how well does it replicate **judges' recommendations**?

Two blocks: estimate normative benchmark, then test the mechanisms

- 1 Empirical Bayes classifier.** Identify top-quality ventures from the score
 - How accurate is the **best feasible rule** given the score, and how well does it replicate **judges' recommendations**?
- 2 Hypothesis tests.** Reduced-form regressions of accuracy and uncertainty on
 - evaluator **expertise**, venture **complexity**, and their **interaction**

Results

Leave-one-out: train on all ventures but one, test on the held-out venture's evaluations

- 1 **Likelihood.** Estimate the score density by venture type, $\hat{f}_{S|V}$, via kernel density estimation (linear kernel, bandwidth 0.32)

Empirical Bayes classifier

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- 2 Posterior.** Apply Bayes' rule on the held-out evaluation

$$\hat{\eta}(\hat{S}) = \Pr(\hat{V} = 1 \mid \hat{S} = \hat{S})$$

with prior = empirical share of top-quality ventures

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- 3 Classify.** Label *top quality* iff $\hat{\eta}(\hat{S}) > \frac{1}{2}$

The benchmark hits a low ceiling

- Classifies ventures correctly **60%** of the time
 - the score **weakly separates** quality, yet probabilities are **well calibrated**
 - limit is the **signal's informativeness**, not a misspecified posterior

▶ Diagnostics

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- Classifies ventures correctly **60%** of the time
 - the score **weakly separates** quality, yet probabilities are **well calibrated**
 - limit is the **signal's informativeness**, not a misspecified posterior
 - ▶ Diagnostics
- **Matches judges' recommendations 79%** of the time
 - **85%** once missing a good venture costs more than admitting a bad one
 - ▶ Visualization

What if admission itself boosts ventures biasing our quality labels?

- **The test.** Give non-admitted ventures a counterfactual boost — survival, FTEs, funding — as if they had been admitted, across a range of plausible effect sizes

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Simulating the treatment effect

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- **The test.** Give non-admitted ventures a counterfactual boost — survival, FTEs, funding — as if they had been admitted, across a range of plausible effect sizes
- **Labels barely move.** Rankings shift, but reclassification as top quality stays at just 3–7%
- **Accuracy is stable** across all scenarios [▶ Accuracy simulations](#)

⇒ **Quality labels are not an artifact of the incubator's treatment effect**

Experience and Accuracy

$$\text{Accuracy}_{i,j} = \alpha + \beta_1 \left(\log(\hat{e}_{i,j}) - \overline{\log(\hat{e}_j)} \right) \\ + \beta_2 \overline{\log(\hat{e}_j)} + \beta_3 \hat{S}_{i,j} + \theta_i + \delta_{t(i)} + \gamma_j + \varepsilon_{i,j}$$

Dependent Variable: Model:	(1)	(2)	Accuracy (3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Variables</i>					
$\log(\hat{e}_{i,j}) - \overline{\log(\hat{e}_j)}$	-6.933** (2.752)	-7.000** (2.740)	-5.071* (2.993)	-9.130** (3.550)	-12.13*** (3.859)
$\overline{\log(\hat{e}_j)}$	5.666* (3.159)	5.624* (3.177)	1.604 (3.871)	4.398 (3.052)	
<i>Fixed-effects</i>					
Batch (9)			Yes	Yes	Yes
Venture (579)				Yes	Yes
Evaluator (72)					Yes
Control: $\hat{S}_{i,j}$		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>					
Observations	1,638	1,638	1,638	1,638	1,638

Table 1: Accuracy and Judges' Experience

Complexity and Accuracy

$$\text{Accuracy}_{i,j} = \alpha + \sum_{f=2}^4 \beta_f \hat{\sigma}_i^f + \hat{S}_{i,j} + \delta_{t(i)} + \gamma_j + \varepsilon_{i,j}$$

Dependent Variable:	Accuracy							
	Disagreement			Text-based				
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Variables</i>								
Complexity _i , Q2	-3.185 (3.049)	-3.238 (3.038)	-1.954 (2.837)	-2.218 (3.123)	-7.585* (4.278)	-6.505 (4.137)	-5.841 (4.043)	-5.806 (4.173)
Complexity _i , Q3	-10.63*** (3.129)	-10.87*** (3.153)	-7.724** (2.989)	-7.783*** (2.908)	-10.87*** (3.827)	-9.839** (3.720)	-8.036** (3.544)	-7.544** (3.419)
Complexity _i , Q4	-9.255*** (3.391)	-10.94*** (3.457)	-8.098** (3.242)	-8.747*** (3.254)	-6.436 (4.121)	-5.539 (3.969)	-5.715 (3.827)	-4.687 (3.883)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>								
Batch (9)			Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Evaluator (72)				Yes				Yes
Controls: $\hat{S}_{i,j}$		Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>								
Accuracy Complexity _i , Q1	69.21%	69.21%	69.21%	69.21%	69.34%	69.34%	69.34%	69.34%
Observations	1,638	1,638	1,638	1,638	1,638	1,638	1,638	1,638

Table 2: Accuracy and Ventures' Complexity

Accuracy experience premium by complexity class

$$\text{Accuracy}_{i,j} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{High Experience}_j + \sum_{f=2}^4 \beta_f \hat{\sigma}_i^f \\ + \sum_{f=2}^4 \gamma_f \text{High Experience}_j \hat{\sigma}_i^f + \hat{s}_{i,j} + \delta_{t(i)} + \varepsilon_{i,j}$$




Figure 2: Accuracy Gain for Experienced Judges by Text Complexity

Measuring cognitive uncertainty

Residual uncertainty about quality, conditional on the score

- 1 **Subgroup classifiers.** Re-estimate the empirical Bayes classifier separately on median-split subsamples — **experts**/non-experts and **complex**/simple ventures
 - lets the posterior belief $\hat{\eta}(\hat{s})$ vary with expertise and complexity

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2 Per-evaluation posterior variance. For each (i, j) :

$$V(\hat{v}_i | \hat{s}_{i,j}) = \hat{\eta}(\hat{s}_{i,j})(1 - \hat{\eta}(\hat{s}_{i,j}))$$

- higher value \Rightarrow score is **less informative** about venture quality

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3 Regress this variance on expertise and complexity

Uncertainty and Experience

$$V(\hat{v}_j | \hat{s}_{i,j}) = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{High Experience}_j \\ + \beta_2 \hat{s}_{i,j} + \beta_3 \hat{s}_{i,j}^2 + \delta_{t(i)} + \theta_i + \varepsilon_{i,j}$$

Dependent Variable:	Uncertainty			
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Variables</i>				
Constant	0.2360*** (0.0012)	0.2349*** (0.0008)	0.2417*** (0.0007)	
High Experience _j	-0.0192*** (0.0027)	-0.0169*** (0.0010)	-0.0170*** (0.0007)	-0.0174*** (0.0011)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>				
Batch (9)				Yes
Venture (579)				Yes
Controls: $\hat{s}_{i,j}$		Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls: $\hat{s}_{i,j}^2$			Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>				
Observations	1,638	1,638	1,638	1,638

Table 3: Cognitive Uncertainty and Judges' Experience

Uncertainty and Complexity

$$V(\hat{v}_j | \hat{s}_{i,j}) = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{High Complexity}_i \\ + \beta_2 \hat{s}_{i,j} + \beta_3 \hat{s}_{i,j}^2 + \delta_{t(i)} + \gamma_j + \varepsilon_{i,j}$$

Dependent Variable:	Disagreement			Uncertainty		Text-based		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Variables</i>								
Constant	0.2120*** (0.0039)	0.2101*** (0.0020)	0.2182*** (0.0021)		0.2211*** (0.0017)	0.2220*** (0.0008)	0.2331*** (0.0008)	
High Complexity _i	0.0262*** (0.0036)	0.0299*** (0.0027)	0.0296*** (0.0028)	0.0303*** (0.0030)	0.0115*** (0.0018)	0.0098*** (0.0010)	0.0093*** (0.0007)	0.0094*** (0.0009)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>								
Batch (9)				Yes				Yes
Evaluator (72)				Yes				Yes
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Controls: $\hat{s}_{i,j}^2$			Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>								
Observations	1,638	1,638	1,638	1,638	1,638	1,638	1,638	1,638

Table 4: Cognitive Uncertainty and Ventures' Complexity

Value of information




Figure 3: Value of information by experience and complexity

Conclusion

Judges behave like Bayesians, but the signal is weak

- Near-optimal, yet only moderately accurate
 - judges track the normative benchmark (79%, 85% under asymmetric costs), favoring *selecting* winners over rejecting losers
 - but accuracy tops out at ~62%: the **signal**, not the judge, is the bottleneck

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 - premium peaks at **intermediate complexity** (text-based measure)
- Complexity **hurts** on both margins
 - lower accuracy *and* higher cognitive uncertainty

Thank you!

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Evaluation criteria (1/2)

1. Does this team have the necessary skills and connections?
Entrepreneurship, sector, job experience, mentors...
2. Does this team have sufficient motivation and ambition?
3. Does this project address a concrete user pain point?
4. Does this project have a viable business model?
5. Is the projected sales volume going to be excellent?
6. Would a VC or BA invest in this project?
7. Does the team have a clear understanding of competition?
8. Does this project have a clear competitive advantage based on some key differentiating factor?

Evaluation criteria (2/2)

9. Does this project address current or expected regulation affecting the business opportunity?
10. What is their technical product development status today?
11. What is their business development status today? Partners, supply chain, production, operations.
12. Have the founders demonstrated that they can execute at high speed?
13. Has the project gained any customer traction at this time?
14. Does the project have the necessary financing in place for the next 12 months?

Institutional background: ventures characteristics

Panel A: General Statistics	
Number of companies	579
HEC graduate	40%
Age	33
Female	46%
Team size	4(2)
Incorporated	64%
Panel B: Business Model	
Subscription	54%
Marketplace	21%
(e)Commerce	15%
Agency / Training center	4%
Mobile App	3%
Media/Social networks	3%
Panel C: Maturity	
Minimum Viable Product	47%
Prototype	27%
Full working Product	26%
Panel D: Sector	
Software IT	23.7%
Finance Real Estate	12.4%
LifeScience Healthcare	11.4%
Hospitality Education	9.7%
Consulting Professional Services	9.3%
Retail Wholesale Distribution	6.9%
Consumer Goods	6.4%
Media Entertainment Culture	6.4%
Other	13.8%

Table 5: Applying ventures

Summary statistics of ventures satisfying eligibility criteria.

Institutional background: ventures performance

Batch	N Ventures	Survival	FTE			€Mln Funding	
		Mean	Mean	P75	P > 0	Mean > 0	P75 > 0
2021 Fall	62	56%	10.9	15.5	11%	13	6.2
2021 Summer	49	71%	10.3	12	12%	12.7	2.9
2022 Spring	60	82%	5.9	9	15%	0.7	1
2022 Summer	96	64%	8.2	9	12%	1.2	1.6
2022 Winter	66	74%	10.2	13	23%	2.3	1.7
2023 Spring	72	85%	4.8	6	4%	0.4	0.6
2023 Summer	66	76%	3.9	5	9%	0.7	1
2023 Winter	54	81%	3.5	4	7%	0.6	0.7
2024 Winter	54	72%	3.8	5	7%	1	1
All	579	73%	6.7	8	11%	3.5	2

Table 6: Ventures Survival Rates, FTE and Funding

Summary statistics for all ventures evaluated across all batches in the dataset.

The Decision Problem

- A latent variable $w \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$ represents the economic quality
- A venture $v \in \{0, 1\}$ can be either "good" or "bad"
 - A venture is "good" if its economic quality lies in the top p percentile: $w \geq \bar{w} = \Phi^{-1}(1 - p)$
 - p is the prior

- A judge evaluating a certain venture produces a signal

$$s = w + \epsilon, \quad \epsilon \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0, \frac{\sigma}{e}\right)$$

- where e proxies the evaluator ability and depends on his expertise;
- The complexity of a venture is the noise of a representative judge in the population $\sigma\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{1}{e}\right]$.

Optimal decision

- A judge decides whether or not to recommend a venture
 - A decision rule $a : S \rightarrow [0, 1]$ assigns to each signal a probability of recommendation
- The decision problem is to select companies that fall in the top percentile of economic quality

$$\max_{a: S \rightarrow [0,1]} \mathbb{E}_s [a(s)v + \gamma(1 - a(s))(1 - v)]$$

- The optimal decision rule ($\gamma = 1$) is

$$a^*(s) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \mathbb{E}[w|s] = \frac{e}{e+\sigma}s \geq \bar{w} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Accuracy

The optimal accuracy is

$$\xi(\sigma, e) = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{\pi} \arctan \sqrt{\frac{e}{\sigma}}$$

Proposition (Optimal accuracy)

- The optimal expected accuracy is decreasing in complexity
- The optimal expected accuracy is increasing in judge expertise

The marginal value of expertise is $\xi_e(\sigma, e)$:

- The accuracy gain is increasing expertise for a certain value of complexity
- It is bell shaped, maximized at intermediate complexity and vanishes for low/high complexity

Cognitive uncertainty

The cognitive uncertainty, the expected posterior variance of venture quality, is

$$\mathbb{E}_s[\text{Var}(v | s)] = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma + e}$$

Proposition (Cognitive uncertainty)

- Cognitive uncertainty is increasing in complexity
- Cognitive uncertainty is decreasing in judge expertise

It captures how much the signal reduce uncertainty about venture quality.

- Governed by the signal-to-noise ratio e/σ , the same force behind accuracy

Ventures performance and recommendations

Batch	Evaluations	$P(\hat{\alpha}(\hat{s}) = 1)$	Survival		FTE		€Mln Funding	
			Mean-diff	r_{pb}	Mean-diff	r_{pb}	Mean-diff	r_{pb}
2021 Fall	144	35%	15%*	0.14*	7.22***	0.29***	0.36	0.02
2021 Summer	156	40%	29%***	0.3***	7.55***	0.29***	3.77*	0.19**
2022 Spring	145	40%	14%**	0.19**	3.08***	0.29***	0.05	0.05
2022 Summer	283	36%	33%***	0.32***	5.33***	0.26***	0.33***	0.24***
2022 Winter	156	37%	17%**	0.18**	8.25***	0.31***	0.92**	0.21***
2023 Spring	219	47%	0%	0	1.85**	0.16**	0	0.01
2023 Summer	188	41%	14%**	0.16**	1.69***	0.25***	0.09**	0.17**
2023 Winter	154	40%	8%	0.1	2.24***	0.24***	0.06	0.11
2024 Winter	193	44%	9%	0.1	1**	0.16**	0.02	0.02
Overall	1638	40%	17%***	0.18***	3.87***	0.22***	0.51**	0.06**

Table 7: Outcomes differences by recommendation status

The table reports statistics by batch and for the overall sample, comparing ventures that received a positive recommendation with those that were rejected.

Ventures quality and recommendations




Figure 4: Judges' Accuracy

The confusion matrix compares judges' admission recommendations with ventures' binary economic quality.

Score and Errors




Figure 5: Decision Errors

The figure displays the ratio of evaluations that correctly or incorrectly classified a given venture as top quality in its batch, for different values of the score

Ventures quality threshold




Figure 6: Recommendation rates and ventures' relative success.

The figure plots, the empirical recommendation rate $P(\hat{a}(\hat{s}) = 1)$ against the corresponding ex-post probability of being top quality within the venture's batch, $P(\hat{v} = 1 | \hat{s})$.

Bayes classifier diagnostics

$$\begin{aligned} \text{BS} &= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^J \sum_{i=1}^n (\hat{v}_{i,j} - \hat{\eta}(\hat{S}_{i,j}))^2 \\ &= \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[\hat{V}(1 - \mathbb{E}[\hat{V}])]}_{\text{Uncertainty}} - \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[(\mathbb{E}[\hat{V} | \hat{\eta}] - \mathbb{E}[\hat{V}])^2]}_{\text{Resolution}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[(\mathbb{E}[\hat{V} | \hat{\eta}] - \hat{\eta}(\hat{S}))^2]}_{\text{Reliability}} \end{aligned}$$

Metric	Value	Interpretation of the value
Balanced Accuracy \bar{v}	60%	Moderate discrimination of ventures quality; matches judges' accuracy (63%).
Brier Score (BS)	0.233	Probabilistic error modestly below the constant-rate classification (0.244).
<i>Uncertainty</i>	0.244	High variance in economic quality consistent with base rate $\bar{v} \approx 0.42$.
<i>Resolution</i>	0.014	Predictions cluster near the base rate, limiting separation of economic quality conditional on score.
<i>Reliability</i>	0.001	Very small miscalibration; predicted probabilities track observed frequencies closely.

Optimal and actual threshold




Figure 7: Score, Actual Recommendation rates and Bayesian posterior
This figure plots (i) judges' recommendation rates and (ii) the estimated Bayesian classifier posterior probability that a venture is "top quality," as functions of the evaluation score in the hold-out sample.

Treatment effect and accuracy

Variable	Min	Mean	Median	Max	No effect
Judges, Accuracy \hat{v}	56%	57%	57%	63%	63%
Estimated Bayes, Accuracy \hat{v}	56%	57%	57%	62%	60%
Estimated Bayes, Accuracy $\hat{a}(\hat{s})$	75%	77%	75%	80%	79%

Table 8: Accuracy rates across simulations

This table presents summary statistics for the accuracy rates of different models across various simulation scenarios, alongside the accuracy rate for the baseline scenario with no treatment effect. The models compared include judges' accuracy in predicting \hat{v} , as well as the estimated Bayes predicting both $\hat{a}(\hat{s})$ and \hat{v}

▶ Simulating treatment effect

Accuracy gain for experienced judges by venture complexity

Dependent Variable:	Disagreement			Accuracy		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Model:						
<i>Variables</i>						
Constant	63.70*** (4.598)	91.11*** (11.89)		69.90*** (3.791)	92.87*** (10.98)	
Complexity _i , Q2	3.291 (5.488)	3.469 (5.497)	4.889 (5.696)	-13.59*** (4.851)	-12.83*** (4.817)	-12.29** (4.842)
Complexity _i , Q3	-6.679 (7.043)	-6.617 (7.101)	-3.351 (7.183)	-11.69** (4.879)	-11.07** (4.836)	-9.696** (4.504)
Complexity _i , Q4	-4.520 (5.293)	-5.940 (5.340)	-3.099 (5.468)	-9.403* (5.546)	-8.006 (5.356)	-8.344 (5.157)
High Experience _j	8.899** (4.397)	8.544* (4.398)	5.445 (4.199)	-1.122 (4.276)	-1.892 (4.448)	-6.755* (3.852)
High Experience _j × Complexity _i , Q2	-10.80* (5.901)	-11.32* (5.684)	-12.01** (5.751)	11.79** (5.842)	12.40** (5.778)	12.87** (6.290)
High Experience _j × Complexity _i , Q3	-5.411 (7.862)	-6.228 (7.800)	-7.227 (7.589)	1.669 (4.576)	2.460 (4.404)	3.320 (4.301)
High Experience _j × Complexity _i , Q4	-7.120 (6.321)	-7.866 (6.083)	-8.756 (6.316)	5.949 (5.971)	4.920 (5.665)	5.254 (5.350)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>						
Batch (9)			Yes			Yes
Controls: $\hat{\delta}_{i,j}$		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>						
Observations	1,638	1,638	1,638	1,638	1,638	1,638

Table 9: Accuracy Gain for Experienced Judges by Complexity